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Abstract—Cooperative communication has great potential to
improve the transmit diversity in multiple users environments.
To achieve a high network-wide energy-efficient performance,
this letter poses the relay selection problem of cooperative
communication as a noncooperative automata game considering
nodes’ selfishness, proving that it is an ordinal game (OPG),
and presents a game-theoretic analysis to address the benefit-
equilibrium decision-making issue in relay selection. A stochastic
learning-based relay selection algorithm is proposed for trans-
mitters to learn a Nash-equilibrium strategy in a distributed
manner. We prove through theoretical and numerical analysis
that the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a
Nash equilibrium state, where the resulting cooperative network
is energy-efficient and reliable. The strength of the proposed
algorithm is also confirmed through comparative simulations in
terms of energy benefit and fairness performances.
Index Terms—Cooperative networks, energy-efficiency, self-
organized relay selection, decentralized learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN general, decision-making algorithms for relay selectionplay an essential role in cooperative communication [1].
Many recent works focus on the best relay selection mecha-
nism (BRS), in which the “best” relay is determined according
to the minimum (or maximum) instantaneous value of a metric
such as transmission power, average error probability, outage
probability, cooperative diversity, etc. [1]–[3]. In addition,
some variations of BRS such as [4] and buffer-aided relay
selection policies [5] have also been developed.
The conventional cooperative decision-making mechanism
to achieve its good performance gain is based on the funda-
mental assumption that individuals are socially responsible.
However, in reality, users are more likely to behave in a
selfish and greedy manner. This fact is further substantiated
by absence of centralized control. Little work considers how
the individual selfishness and greediness impacts the overall
cooperative communication. It is still left to answer whether
there potentially exists a desired energy-efficient network
state and how to achieve such desired state with a good
tradeoff between energy cost and system performance, if users
behave selfishly in networking interactions. We believe that
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providing decentralized benefit-compatible and self-adaptive
relay selection methods can open an appealing way to promote
cooperative networks.
In this letter, we model the joint behaviors of selfish
users in the decision-making process of relay selection as a
noncooperative automata game. For this relay selection game,
we propose a novel utility function specifying that nodes
have enough incentive i) to establish and maintain reliable
cooperative communication with low transmission power level
and ii) to improve the energy consumption balance. This
work provides a novel game-theoretic mapping from the relay
selection of self-interest-driven nodes regarding selfish interac-
tions in cooperative communication to a proper decentralized
learning-based decision-making formulation, helping to better
understand the desired strategic behaviors of selfish nodes
and to induce an energy-efficient Nash-equilibrium cooperative
network.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless ad-hoc network where multiple
nodes co-exist, denoted by a set N = f1; 2; : : : ; Ng. Some
nodes are the sources s 2 S  N who would like to transmit
packets to specified destinations d 2 D  N using the two-
time-slot repetition-coded DF cooperative communication [1].
Let the maximum transmission power of each node be pmax.
We denote by As  N the set of s’s neighboring nodes. Each
source s can select a relay as from As, i.e., as 2 As. We
operate the cooperative transmissions in discrete successive
time periods f[tt; (t+ 1)t)jt = 0; 1; 2; : : :g where t is a
specific time period. Additionally, every time period t can
be further divided into a series of two successive time slots,
in each of which different transmissions are active.
We employ a channel model incorporating effects of
Rayleigh fading, shadow fading and path loss [1], [3], [4].
Given a specific data rate R in bit=s=Hz specified according
to the QoS requirement and a specific outage probability
threshold s that should not be exceeded in order to guarantee
the transmission reliability in the cooperative communication,
we can derive the minimum power consumption of the direct
(Pminsds;D) and the cooperative (P
min
sds;C
) transmissions by
Pminsds;D = SNRsds;DN0BR (1)
Pminsds;C = 2SNRsds;CN0BR (2)
where N0 denotes the variance of the zero-mean mutually
independent, circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian noises,
and B denotes the bandwidth assigned to achieve per-unit
spectrum effectiveness. SNRsds;D and SNRsds;C represent the
2corresponding signal-noise-ratios, the formulas of which can
be referred to in [1]. In addition, based on (1) and (2), the
transmission power can also be normalized by Pminsds;D=N0RB
and Pminsds;C=N0RB, respectively. The detailed expressions of
the normalized minimum transmission power can be found in
[4]. We remark that in our experiments we use the normalized
forms rather than the original to avoid introducing additional
parameter settings.
III. DECENTRALIZED LEARNING FRAMEWORK FOR
ADAPTIVE RELAY SELECTION
A. Learning Automata Game Mapping
We formulate the relay selection as a dynamic noncoop-
erative game where S is the set of the players. The action
set of any player s 2 S is defined as the neighbor set As,
where each relay candidate is treated as an action the node
s can select. We further define as(t) 2 As, representing the
relay of s in the t-th time period. An action profile can then
be as(t) = (as(t);a s(t)) where a s(t) denotes the actions
taken by the others s0 2 Sn fsg. Let A = s2SAs be the
space of all action vectors. For any s 2 S, a utility function
us(as(t)) : A ! R can model its reward or payoff depending
on the action profile as(t). A vector collecting all the utilities
is u =
 
us1 ; : : : ; usjSj

: A ! RjSj. In addition, we define
the energy residual of any node i 2 N at the beginning of the
t-th time period by Ei(t). A collection of the residual energy
of all the nodes, E(t) =
 
E1(t); : : : ; EjN j(t)

, is the external
state. We present the game by the tuple

(t) = hS;E(t);A;ui (3)
Due to the selfishness and greediness, each node tends to
maximize its payoff in the relay selection game 
(t). Such a
payoff is considered to consist of the benefit a node receives
from the resulting cooperative network and the cost it incurs
in cooperative communication. Thus, a utility function of each
player captures the benefit-cost trade-off and maps its action
profile to a payoff. For s 2 S , we can model us (as(t)) as
us (as(t)) = fs (as(t))  gs (as(t)) (4)
where fs : A ! R denotes the benefit s can gain when the
action profile as(t) is deployed, and gs : As ! R represents
the cost incurred. To be specific, in the context of cooperative
communication, each player can receive a benefit in establish-
ing a high-reliable communication and balancing the energy
utilization. For any i 2 S , the reliability in i’s cooperative
transmission is quantified by the outage probability, denoted
by Pr (Pidi;C(t)), which is the possibility that the maximum
average mutual information (Inf sdi;C) between i and di at
the power level Pidi;C(t) is less than the required spectral
efficiency R, i.e., Pr (Pidi;C(t)) = Prob

Inf sdi;C < R
	
. It
should be noted that Inf sdi;C is a non-decreasing function
of the power level Pidi;C(t), and the outage probability of
the DF cooperative communication can be found in [1]–
[4]. A QoS-oriented reliability usually imposes a constraint,
Pr (Pidi;C(t))  i. To capture the transmission reliability of
the overall network, an indicator function is given by
Is(as(t)) =
(
0; if 9i 2 S; i < Pr(Pidi;C(t))
1; otherwise
(5)
Accordingly, if and only if Pr(Pidi;C(t))  i for all
i 2 S, Is(as(t)) = 1, indicating that a QoS-oriented reliable
cooperative network is established.
To quantify the energy utilization, the dynamics of the
average energy residual of each s’s neighbors is given by
Ws(as(t)) =
1
jAsj+ 1
 
Es(t)
Es(0)
+
X
i2As
Ei(t)
Ei(0)
!
(6)
Due to the fact that a transmitter can benefit from its usable
maximum power level pmax (a higher pmax implies a larger
transmission capability), a specific fs (as(t)) is proposed
based on (5) and (6):
fs (as(t)) = Is(as(t))

2!1pmax
Es(0)
Es(t)
+ !2Ws(as(t))

(7)
which signifies the comprehensive benefit of a player in
terms of transmission reliability, energy utilization and power
capability. !1 and !2 are two positive weights. It is noted that
since a cooperative transmission involves a source and a relay,
the total maximum usable power is 2pmax.
On the other side, the cost incurred in cooperative communi-
cation can be naturally represented by the energy consumption
and residual energy. Thus, the cost component is given by
gs (as(t)) = !1Psds;C(t)
Es(0)
Es(t)
(8)
In a normal form, we express the relay selection game by

(t) : max
as(t)2As
fus (as(t);a s(t))g (9)
The game is played repeatedly, so that the cooperative network
can evolve dynamically via iterative process.
B. Theoretic Properties of Proposed Model
To facilitate the theoretical analysis, we modify the action
set of any s, As =

aks
 k = 1; : : : ; jAsj	, as an ordered
set where the elements aks are arranged in order of their
corresponding power consumption levels P ksds;C (k can be
treated as the order number). That is, in this ordered set,
ak 1s > a
k
s can correspondingly indicate P
k 1
sds;C
 P ksds;C .
Thus, Is is monotonically non-decreasing with respect to
as 2 As. We first prove that 
(t) is a ordinal potential game.
Theorem 1: Given (4), 
(t) is an ordinal potential game,
a potential function of which can be constructed by
U (as(t);a s(t)) =
X
s2S
fs (as(t);a s(t))
 
X
s2S
gs (as(t);a s(t))
(10)
3Proof: For any player s, the change in the utility function
of s when it switches from the action as(t) to a0s(t) is
us = us (as(t);a s(t))  us (a0s(t);a s(t))
=2!1pmax
Es(0)
Es(t)
 
Is (as(t);a s(t))
  Is (a0s(t);a s(t))
!
  !1Es(0)
Es(t)
 
Psds;C(t)  P 0sds;C(t)

+ !2
 
Is (as(t);a s(t))Ws (as(t);a s(t))
  Is (a0s(t);a s(t))Ws (a0s(t);a s(t))
!
(11)
Without loss of generality, we can assume as(t) > a0s(t), i.e.,
Psds;C(t)  P 0sds;C(t), so that it sees
us
(
 0; if Is (as(t);a s(t)) > Is (a0s(t);a s(t))
 0 or < 0; if Is (as(t);a s(t)) = Is (a0s(t);a s(t))
(12)
In a similar way, we can also get
U = U (as(t);a s(t))  U (a0s(t);a s(t))
= us
+
X
i2S;i6=s
8<:
(Ii (as(t);a s(t))  Ii (a0s(t);a s(t)))


2!1pmax
Ei(0)
Ei(t)
+ !2Wi(ai(t))
 9=;
(13)
For the first case presented in (12), the sign of
(Ii (as(t);a s(t))  Ii (a0s(t);a s(t))) in the second ter-
m of (13) is the same as that of us. For the sec-
ond case in (12), since the transmission reliability of the
overall cooperative transmission links is left unchanged,
(Ii (as(t);a s(t))  Ii (a0s(t);a s(t))) = 0 is held for any
i 2 S. This indicates U = us. It sees that the sign of
U is always the same as that of us. This result can also
be proven when as(t) < a0s(t). To sum up, 
(t) is an OPG
where U is its ordinal potential function [6].
Based on Theorem 1, the existence of a Nash Equilibrium
in 
(t) can be always guaranteed and it coincides with a
maximizer of the ordinal potential function U [6].
C. Stochastic Learning based Relay Selection Adaptation
To learn the Nash-equilibrium optimal strategies, we design
a decentralized learning-based algorithm. Let the optimal
power level associated with aks 2 As be P k;minsds;C . We present
a strategy of s as xsds(t) =
 
xsds;1(t); : : : ; xsds;jAsj(t)

,
i.e., the selection probability distribution over As. Then, we
can derive the update of xsds(t) based on the linear reward-
inaction approach [7]:
xsds;k(t+ 1) =(
xsds;k(t) + ers (as(t)) (1  xsds;k(t)) ; if aks = as(t)
xsds;k(t)  ers (as(t))xsds;k(t); otherwise
(14)
where  2 (0; 1) is the learning rate and ers (as(t)) is the
instantaneous reward that the player s perceives when it
currently takes the action as(t), which is normalized in the
interval (0; 1) and determined based on its utility function (4):
ers (as(t)) = us (as(t);a s(t))  ulowers (t)
uuppers (t)  ulowers (t)
(15)
where ulowers (t) = min0t fus (as();a s())g and
uuppers (t) = max0t fus (as();a s())g. The proposed
decentralized learning-based adaptive relay selection (DL-
bARS) algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 DLbARS
1: Initialization: Let t = 0; for any s, set as(t) =
argminaks2As
n
pk;minsds;C
o
; s performs transmission assisted
by as(t); set xsds;k(t) = 1=jAsj for k = 1; : : : ; jAsj;
2: Adaptation: For t  1, each s updates its xsds(t) by (14),
and selects a new as(t) by stochastic experiment with this
new xsds(t); determine the optimal power level P
min
sds;C
by
(2) to perform the cooperative transmission;
3: Update: The sources and relays update their energy
residuals Es(t), Eas(t)(t); each source derives a new
instantaneous normalized reward ers(t) by (15);
4: Set t = t+1 and repeat Adaptation and Update in turn.
Next, we show the convergence of the DLbARS as follows:
Theorem 2: The LbDARS guarantees the transmission re-
liability of each cooperation link and converges to a Nash
Equilibrium of the game 
(t) that is locally energy efficient
when the learning rate  is sufficiently small.
Proof: In the LbDARS, once a source s 2 S chooses
a certain relay aks (an action), it can determine an optimal
power level corresponding to aks by (2), P
k;min
sds;C
, such that
Pr

P k;minsds;C

= s is satisfied. Thus, the transmission relia-
bility constraint is always held at every iteration stage.
Additionally, since the learning rate  is assumed sufficient-
ly small, it follows the analysis of [7] that the update formation
(14) can reduce to an ordinary differential equation (ODE)
system (noting
PjAsj
l=1 xsds;l(t) = 1)
dxsds;k(t)
dt
= xsds;k(t)
jAsjX
l=1
xsds;l(t)
 ers  aks
  ers  als
!
(16)
We define the expected ordinal potential function with
respect to the mixed strategy profile of s as U(t) =
Exsds (t) [U(as(t);a s(t))] =
PjAsj
l=1 xsds;l(t)U(als;a s(t)),
and then get @U(t)=@xsds;k(t) = U(aks ;a s(t)). Combining
this result and (16) further leads to
dU(t)
dt
=
1
2
X
s2S
jAsjX
k=1
jAsjX
l=1
xsds;k(t)xsds;l(t)Uers  0 (17)
where ers = ers(aks)   ers(als) and U = U(aks ;a s(t))  
U(als;a s(t)). Since sgn (U) = sgn (us) = sgn (ers) as
shown in Theorem 1. It follows (17) that U(t) is nondecreas-
ing in the phase space of the ODE system. Because U(t) is
bounded, it is expected to converge to a Nash equilibrium.
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IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We carry out a series of experiments to show the perfor-
mance of the proposed method. We adopt the settings in Table
I throughout the experiments. Additionally, pmax is set to be
the direct transmission power level when the distance reaches
distmax. Each source transmits packetNum packets during
packetNum iterations. The initial energy of each node is
identically set to be (packetNum+10)pmaxt (for the sake
of example, let t = 1s).
TABLE I
THE BASIC PARAMETER SETTINGS.
The maximum transmission distance distmax 150m
The number of packets transmitted packetNum 1000
The path loss coefficient  3.0
The minimum data rate R 1.0
The outage probability constraint  0.01
The learning rate  0.1
The weights !1 and !2 1.0
Firstly, we uniformly and randomly generate 50 nodes
distributed in a region of 300m300m, and also randomly
generate 5 transmission pairs. We analyze the unilateral de-
viation of the strategies learned by these players. In Fig. 1,
it can be found that lower benefit is obtained by unilateral
deviation experiments, which indicates that each player cannot
gain additional benefit by unilaterally changing their strategies,
suggesting that a Nash equilibrium state is reached by the
proposed algorithm.
Next, we compare the performance of the proposed
learning-based algorithm (‘Proposed’) with two other schemes,
one of which is the minimum transmission power based
scheme [1] (‘Compared#1’), and the other is based on the
maintenance of an adaptive relay candidate set [4] (‘Com-
pared#2’). We set jSj 2 f5; 10; 15; : : : ; 40g and the total node
number is 2jSj+50. For comparison, we evaluate the average
normalized residual energy of the network, the well-known
Jain’s fairness index (JFI) of energy residuals as well as the
average reward of the sources against different jSj. Monte
Carlo simulations are conducted for performance comparison.
All the Monte Carlo simulations have been performed with
100 replications per simulation point, and the results are shown
with the standard deviations (See Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). We
can find that the Nash-equilibrium energy-efficient cooperative
network achieved by our proposed method has comprehensive
advantages over the other two schemes, since it can benefit
the cooperative network more in terms of energy benefit and
fairness performance metrics.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we have investigated the issue of energy-
efficient cooperative transmission in wireless ad-hoc network.
This problem is formulated as a multi-player game automata
model, and a decentralized learning-based relay selection
algorithm has been proposed to achieve a self-organized
cooperative network. The convergence of the proposed al-
gorithm to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is confirmed
through simulations. Monte Carlo experiment results reveal the
comprehensive strength of this algorithm in terms of average
reward and energy consumption balance.
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